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Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
In December of 1961, the plaintiffs, members of the Lanza family
and sole owners of all 20,000 shares of stock in the Victor Billiard
Company (Victor), exchanged their stock for 20,428 shares in the BarChris Construction Company (BarChris). Within one year of this
exchange, BarChris filed a petition in bankruptcy. 2 The plaintiffs were
unsuccessful in an attempt to recover their Victor stock in a recission
action and, as a result, were forced to borrow $100,000 to pay the
trustee in bankruptcy for its return.8 The Lanzas subsequently commenced an action in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York against various former directors and officers of
BarChris seeking both compensatory and punitive damages, and contending that the named parties had induced them to enter the original
exchange transaction by a number of misrepresentations and material
omissions. 4 The plaintiffs premised their claim on section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act),5 rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder, section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933
Act), 7 common law fraud, and a theory of prima facie tort.8
1 Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1280 (2d Cir. 1973).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
8 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972). Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interestate [sic] commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
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After a five week trial, the district court found that the Lanzas
had been misled by various omissions and material misstatements in
the exchange transaction. 9 While the court held a number of defendants liable, one of the BarChris directors, Bertram Coleman, was
found to have no liability. 10 After considering the evidence, the court
concluded that Coleman was not only unaware of the deception that
had taken place, but that, under the circumstances, he had sufficiently
complied with any duty that he might have had regarding the investigation of material facts and disclosure of such facts to the plaintiffs.'
However, the court did qualify its holding. By pointing out that
outside directors such as Coleman may have a duty to inform third
parties who are relying upon misleading statements or omissions when
becoming involved in a transaction, it appears that the court based its
disposition toward Coleman upon the facts of the case. 12 Concluding
For a recent bibliography of material dealing with rule lOb-5, see 1 SECupTIES REc. L.J.
96 (1973).
7 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). Section 17(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
8 479 F.2d at 1280. Both the district court and the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit decided to treat the requirements of a private action under rule lOb-5 and section
17(a) as identical for purposes of this case. Id. at 1280 n.2.
9 Lanza v. Drexel & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,826, at 90,092 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
Judge Frankel listed ten ways in which the prospectus alone, presented to the plaintiffs'
representative, was false and misleading. In addition, there were inaccuracies found to
exist in both the annual report and financial statement which had been presented for
consideration. Id. at 90,092-94. Numerous important facts regarding occurrences prior to
the exchange transaction were also not disclosed to the plaintiffs. Id. at 90,096-97.
10 479 F.2d at 1280. In order to meet a demand for working capital in 1961, BarChris
sold a series of debentures. Coleman was a partner in the firm of Drexel & Company, which
was the primary underwriter of the debenture transaction. Acting as Drexel's representative, Coleman had become a director of BarChris and served in that capacity from April
of 1961 through March of 1962, at which time he resigned. He was later named chairman
of the board and served in that position from July of 1962 until BarChris filed its petition
for bankruptcy. Id. at 1282 & n.7. For an analysis of the facts which led to the debenture
transaction and BarChris' financial situation, see Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283
F. Supp. 643, 652-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
11 479 F.2d at 1289. The court of appeals quoted the district court's opinion in
reaching these conclusions. Id. at 1288-89.
12 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. If92,826, at 90,104-05. The circumstances that led to the
completion of the Victor-BarChris exchange transaction involved a number of meetings
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its discussion of Coleman's duty to inform the plaintiffs of the misstatements and omissions, the court stated that "[w]hatever requirement of due diligence there is under Rule lOb-5, it was satisfied by
Coleman's personal inquiries to the responsible parties within the
14
corporation."1 The complaint against him was dismissed.
The primary issue raised on appeal was the extent of Coleman's
liability.15 As stated by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
the specific question was
from March to November of 1961, at which Shulman, the Lanzas' accountant and representative, spoke primarily with Kircher, who was the treasurer and a board member of
BarChris. During this time, Shulman was supplied with various materials relating to
BarChris' financial and business status. Coleman was not present at any of these meetings
and apparently was unaware that they had taken place. On November 6, 1961, the board
of directors approved the exchange. Once again, Coleman was not present and did not
learn of what had happened at that meeting until he received the minutes in the mail
approximately one week later. The exchange contract was presented to the board and
approved on November 21, at which time Coleman was present. The dosing followed on
December 14. 479 F.2d at 1280, 1283-84.
Although Coleman was aware of a number of developments that were unfavorable to
BarChris' financial position, his conduct seems to show that he acted reasonably in
attempting to prevent future difficulties. Following the release of the corporation's
financial statement in August, he asked Kircher about the reported drop in earnings that
BarChris was realizing. When told that a particular customer of BarChris had gone
bankrupt, leaving BarChris in an unsecured position, Coleman demanded that steps be
taken to make sure this did not happen in connection with other customers. Id. at 1285.
Despite his awareness of such problems, Coleman believed that the business and
financial condition of BarChris was good, in light of the fact that earnings figures prepared by the accounting department and Kircher were higher than those of the previous
year. See id. at 1286.
On December 6, a meeting of the board was called to discuss the resignation of BarChris' president. Coleman was present. At that time, Kircher read a statement opposing
the elevation of the vice president to that post and indicating, among other things, that
BarChris was faced with sharp competition, a drop in earnings, and poor organization
and judgment by its officers. Realizing that there existed management difficulties, Coleman
expressed the opinion that the corporation was in need of a management consultant. Id.
at 1286-88.
Despite these problems, it appears that Coleman trusted Kircher and did not doubt his
judgment. As stated by the district court, "[tlhe accounting devices of Kircher et al. deceived not only the investing public, but Coleman as well." CCH FEn. SEc. L. REP.
92,826, at 90,105.
13 CCH FED. SEc. L. RiEP. 1 92,826, at 90,105. At this point the court distinguished
what it considered to be the requirement of due diligence in rule lOb-5 with that in
section 11(a) of the 1933 Act:
While . . . Coleman's inquiry was not satisfactory for the due diligence requirement of § 11(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, that high standard--designed as it
was to put a heavy burden of accurate disclosure on those seeking to register a new
public issue-is not incorporated in Rule lOb-5, which applies to all corporate
documents and releases, not just to registration statements or prospectuses.
Id. (emphasis in original). For further discussion of section 11, see note 69 infra.
14 CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. 92,826, at 90,107.
15 479 F.2d at 1281. In addition, Kircher, the treasurer and a board member of Bar-
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[w]hat duty, if any, does Rule lOb-5 impose on a director in Coleman's position to insure that all material, adverse information
is conveyed to prospective purchasers of the corporation's stock
where the director does not know that these prospective purchasers
are not receiving all such information? 6
In Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 17 the court, sitting en banc, held that a director who is a non-participant in a transaction owes no duty to insure that
such information is conveyed to prospective purchasers.' The court
further concluded that the liability of a director in this position under
rule lOb-5 is merely secondary, comparing it to "that of an aider and
abettor, a conspirator, or a substantial participant in fraud perpetrated
by others."'19 Reviewing the evidence, the court agreed with the decision of the court below that Coleman had neither been aware of, nor
knowingly participated in, the misrepresentations made to the plaintiffs, and therefore was not liable in this secondary manner. 20 The court
also rejected the plaintiffs' contention that Coleman, even in the
absence of a duty to convey such material information, was liable because he had been negligent in not ascertaining whether adverse facts
concerning BarChris' financial situation, of which he had prior knowledge, had been accurately and completely disclosed. 21 Consequently,
22
the dismissal of the charges against Coleman was affirmed.
In establishing the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, it was the
intent of Congress to
substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of
caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business
2
ethics in the securities industry. 3
This attitude seems to pervade the development of what has been
Chris, was appealing the denial of demand for a jury trial after there had been an initial
waiver of that right. Id. at 1309-10. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision
on this issue after concluding its lengthy discussion of Coleman. Id. at 1311.
16 Id. at 1289.
17 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
18 Id. at 1289.
19 Id. (footnote omitted).
20

Id.

Id. at 1304-06. In this regard, the court stated that "proof of a willful or reckless
disregard for the truth is necessary to establish liability under Rule lOb-5." Id. at 1306
(footnote omitted). While the court went on to say that "[a] director may have an ob;ligation to maintain an awareness of significant corporate developments and to consider
any material, adverse developments which come to his attention," it felt that Coleman had
sufficiently met this standard. Id. For further discussion of the conduct necessary for liability under rule lOb-5, see note 76 infra.
22 479 F.2d at 1289.
23 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (citing H.R.
REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933)).
21
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described as the "federal law of corporations," 24 which, although
dealing with various areas of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, has placed heavy
emphasis on the evolution of corporate management's civil liability
under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. 25 Nevertheless, this philosophy of
full disclosure, by itself, does little to aid in a proper interpretation
of the rule. Because the language used in the construction of lOb-5 is
broad, it has led to uncertainty regarding what actions the rule is
intended to prohibit. 26 An examination of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, and
rule lOb-5 specifically, is insufficient to supply "the legal measuring
rod" 27 necessary for such interpretation. Consequently, various aspects
of the rule's legislative history and its development through case law
must be considered.
A review of the history of the 1934 Act and rule 1Ob-5 reveals that
there is a definite lack of reference to a director's duty to convey
adverse, material information to prospective purchasers or to insure that
information provided is accurate. A Senate Report in 1934,28 dealing
generally with the 1934 Act, uses language suggesting that the main
thrust of the Act was to prohibit fraudulent schemes against purchasers,
not to create liability in the absence of culpability on the part of the
person being charged. 29 Similiarly, it is significant to note that at the
24 E.g., Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94, 97 (N.D. Ill. 1967); W.

129 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as KNEPPER].
25 KNEPPER, supra note 24, at 129. The author, quoting from Green v. Wolf Corp.,
406 F.2d 291, 295 (2d Cir. 1968), points out that rule lOb-5 represents approximately onethird of all contemporary cases brought under SEC statutes and is the cause of almost as
much litigation as all of the other federal securities antifraud provisions combined.
KNEPPER, supra note 24, at 130.
26 Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 276-77 (3d Cir.) (Adams, J.,
concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972); see Drake v. Thor Power
Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94, 102 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
27 Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 277 (3d Cir.) (Adams, J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972). Judge Adams provides a recent
analysis of the history and development of rule lOb-5. 458 F.2d at 276-316.
28 S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). The Report states in pertinent part:
ifihe bill provides that any person who unlawfully manipulates the price of a
security, or who induces transactions in a security by means of false or misleading
statements, or who makes a false or misleading statement in the report of a
corporation, shall be liable in damages ....
Id. at 12-13.
29 The Report is discussed in the Lanza decision:
This report likewise contains no evidence of any attention to the obligations of
directors to insure that all material, adverse information is conveyed to prospective purchasers of the company's stock. Indeed, this report's explanation of the
civil liability provisions of the bill gives rise to the inference that no such duty
was intended ....
479 F.2d at 1291 n.35.
KNEPPER, LIABILrry OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DiREcroRs
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time rule lOb-5 was promulgated, the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC), in an official release concerning that rule, made frequent use
of the word fraud:
"The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced
the adoption of a rule prohibiting fraud by any person in connection -with the purchase of securities. The previously existing
rules against fraud in the purchase of securities applied only to
brokers and dealers. The new rule closes a loophole in the protections against fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting
individuals or companies30from buying securities if they engage in
fraud in their purchase."
In that same year, the SEC's annual report reiterated that the reason
for the rule was protection of investors against fraudulent activities.3 1
Thus, the background of rule lOb-5 seems to suggest that in
establishing the rule, Congress sought to create an antifraud provision
under which liability would arise due to an individual's intentional
actions to deceive, rather than a provision that would specifically impose upon an outside director a duty to convey adverse, material information that might affect the actions of a prospective purchaser.
Nevertheless, this history does not conclusively reject the possibility
that such a requirement may arise, and therefore does little to delineate
the proper interpretation of the rule regarding this issue.
The courts have realized the difficulty of interpreting rule lOb-5,
and have often turned to prior case law dealing with the rule in their
efforts to provide definitive guidelines. 32 In doing so, it is important
to note that certain issues that have a bearing on the duty to convey
have already been resolved. It is well established that lOb-5 implies a
private right of action,83 thus eliminating the requirement that a public
offering or a registered security be involved. Furthermore, interpreta80 Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 278 (3d Cir.) (quoting from
SEC Securities Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942)) (emphasis by the court), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 874 (1972).
31 8 SEC ANN. REP. (1942) states:
During the fiscal year the Commission adopted Rule X-10B-5 as an additional
protection to investors. The new rule prohibits fraud by any person in connection
with the purchase of securities, while the previously existing rules against fraud
in the purchase of securities applied only to brokers and dealers.
Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
32 See, e.g., Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94, 97 (N.D. 111. 1967); cf.
Demarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 842 (2d Cir. 1968).
33 Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94, 97 (N.D.111. 1967); Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946); E. GADSBY, THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES EXCHANGE Acr oF 1934 § 5.03, at 5-10 (1IA BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS rev. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as GAsBY]; KNEPPER, supra note 24, at 129.
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tion has made it clear that the rule's prohibition of affirmative false
representation covers the intentional lack of disclosure of material facts
3 4
by both officers and directors.
It is important to realize, however, that in the cases in which
officers and directors have been charged with violation of the duty to
disclose, the courts have discussed this duty primarily in connection
with corporate "insiders."8 5 An insider has been described as "one who
is in a peculiarly favorable position to know of important corporate
developments."36 Further, there is no requirement that the individual
be a corporate officer, as long as he "is in possession of information the
publication of which might affect the value of the company's securi37
ties."
Nevertheless, there are limitations on the situations in which
information must be disclosed under the rule. It has been held that a
corporate insider must disclose only material information that will
affect the purchase or sale of corporate stock. 38 The generally accepted
test for materiality is whether a particular fact would influence the
actions of the other party involved in the purchase or sale.8 9 In addition,
even when a duty of disclosure arises, it will not be applied unreasonably. This attitude was expressed by the Seventh Circuit in Kohler v.
Kohler Co. 40 In Kohler, the court felt that an insider should be re34 GADSBY, supra note 33, § 5.03[1][b], at 5-15; KNEPPER, supra note 24, at 167.

35 E.g., Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963). In discussing rule lOb-5,
the Kohler court stated that the rule
was intended to create a form of fiduciary relationship between so-called corporate
"insiders" and "outsiders" with whom they deal in company securities which
places upon the insider duties more exacting than mere abstention from what
generally is thought to be fraudulent practices.
Id. The court went on to state that any limitations on the duties must be determined
through a case by case method. Id. at 637-38. See also Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp.
49 (N.D. Ohio 1959), wherein the court stated that
when read as a whole, Rule X lOb-5 imposes the duty to speak and to make a
full disclosure of material facts in those circumstances where silence would constitute fraud.
Id. at 59.
36 GADSBY, supra note 33, § 5.03[1][b], at 5-17.
37 Id. at 5-18. For further discussion of insiders and rule lOb-5, see Painter, Inside
Information: Growing Pains for the Development of Federal Corporation Law Under
Rule lOb-5, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1361 (1965); Comment, Insider Liability Under Securities
Exchange Act Rule lOb-5: The Cady, Roberts Doctrine, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 121 (1962).
38 See, e.g., Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 266 (1st Cir. 1966); Ruckle v. Roto
Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1964); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir.
1963); Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962); Reed v. Riddle
Airlines, 266 F.2d 314, 315 (5th Cir. 1959); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp.
798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
39 See, e.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del. 1951).
40 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:363

quired to "exercise reasonable and due diligence" both in determining
what is material at the time the transaction is taking place, and in completely disclosing any material facts of which an outsider might be
41
uninformed and which would most likely influence his judgment.
The court then noted that the requirements of the rule are satisfied
"[w]hen the totality of facts and circumstances indicates that such dili'42
gence has been observed.
Although prior cases have dealt with an insider's duty to disclose
under rule lOb-5, none have specifically discussed this issue in connection with outside directors. However, by analogy, a number have
shed light on the subject. Wessel v. Buhler$3 involved the liability of
an independent accountant (Jordan) for an alleged violation of the
rule. Jordan had been hired to prepare various financial statements
for a corporation, and in doing so, had become aware of serious deficiencies in the corporation's financial condition. Upon completion,
the statements were given to the board of directors and used in a
manner unrelated to the issuance of stock. 45 None had been made " 'in
a manner reasonably calculated to influence the investing public.'
The plaintiffs, claiming that they had made purchases of the corporation's stock in reliance upon certain prospectuses, contended that
Jordan owed them a duty to disclose his knowledge of the adverse
financial condition of the corporation and that, by failing to do so,
Jordan had become an aider and abettor in the deception. 47 This
contention was flatly rejected by the court:
",,

We find nothing in Rule lOb-5 that purports to impose
liability on anyone whose conduct consists solely of inaction....
We perceive no reason, consonant with the congressional purpose
in enacting the Securities 48and Exchange Act of 1934, thus to expand Rule lOb-5 liability.
A Second Circuit decision discussed in the Lanza opinion 49 is
Moerman v. Zipco, Inc.50 In Moerman, the plaintiff based his decision

to purchase corporate stock upon information received from an officer
Id. at 642.
Id.
43 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971).
44 Id. at 281.
45 Id. at 282.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 283.
48 Id. (citations omitted).
49 479 F.2d at 1301.
50 302 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), af'd, 422 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1970).
41

42
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of the corporation (Nasser) during various conversations. It was the
opinion of the court that Nasser had failed to disclose all the material
information of which he had knowledge that would have affected the
plaintiff's purchase, and therefore was liable under rule lOb-5. 51 The
import of the Moerman decision is the court's attitude toward the
other directors who were also being charged. In discussing the liability
of these other defendants, it did not even consider the question of
whether they were liable under rule lOb-5:
Since [the plaintiff] had no significant contact with any defendant other than [the officer held liable under the rule], the liability
of the other defendant officers and directors must rest solely on
52
Section 20 of the Securities Exchange Act ....
Equally important was the court's attitude toward the responsibility
of these directors, who neither knew of nor induced Nasser's fraudulent acts, for the actions of the officers of the corporation:
Directors cannot be expected to exercise the kind of supervision
over a corporation president that brokers must exercise over sales3
men. 5
The common law is also relevant to the proper interpretation of
rule lOb-5,5 4 since it has been recognized that "courts generally interpret statutes in the context of the common law." 55 It appears that a
director owed no duty to convey adverse, material information to
prospective purchasers of stock in the absence of deceit. This view reappears in both English and American decisions prior to the passing
of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Such cases have stated that corporate
directors are not insurers of the truthfulness and ability of the officers
and employees that they have selected. 56
51 See 302 F. Supp. at 446. The plaintiff had been led to believe that he was to be
one of only a few shareholders when, in reality, this was untrue. Id. at 443.
52 Id. at 446-47 (emphasis added). Section 20 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.

§ 78t (1970), states in pertinent part:
(a) Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under
any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also
be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled
person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the
act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.
53 302 F. Supp. at 447.

54 See Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule lOb-5, 32 U. CHI. L. REv.
824, 828 (1965).
55 Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir. 1962).
56 In Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891), a national bank failed as the result of
illegal loans which had been authorized by the bank's president. Id. at 142. In charging the
directors of the bank, it was not alleged that they had been aware of or had acquiesced in
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The 1901 case of Dovey v. Cory57 is an excellent example of the
English common law position. In Dovey, a director of a bank (Cory)
had been charged in connection with the fraudulent preparation of a
balance sheet. It was established that Cory had not been"aware of the
fraudulent actions committed by particular officers and directors of the
bank who prepared the balance sheet in question.58 Directing its attention to the liability of all persons in positions comparable to that of
a director, the court considered the issue to be "how far they are called
upon to distrust and be on their guard against the possibility of fraud
being committed by their subordinates."' 59 The court then went on to
clearly answer this question:
It is obvious if there is such a duty it must render anything like
an intelligent devolution of labour impossible .... I cannot think

that it can be expected of a director that he should be watching
either the inferior officers of the bank or verifying the calculations
of the auditors himself. The business of life could not go on if
people could not trust those who are put into a position of trust
for the express purpose of attending to details of management. 5
Indicative of the American viewpoint are Judge Learned Hand's
remarks in the 1924 case of Barnes v. Andrews."' The plaintiff in
Barnes was attempting to hold an outside director liable for the expenses of printing circulars containing false statements which had been
used in the sale of corporate shares. 62 In rejecting the plaintiff's claim,
Judge Hand seemed sensitive to the difficulties that an outside director
would face if he were unable to place reasonable reliance upon the
officers and other directors in the corporation:
the illegal actions. Id. at 145. Finding no liability on the part of the defendants, the
Supreme Court discussed the responsibility of directors in such situations:
They are not insurers of the fidelity of the agents whom they have appointed,
who are not their agents but the agents of the corporation; and they cannot be
held responsible for losses resulting from the wrongful acts or omissions of other
directors or agents, unless the loss is a consequence of their own neglect of duty,
either for failure to supervise the business with attention or in neglecting to use
proper care in the appointment of agents.
Id. at 147. For further cases supporting this view of director liability, see Cory Mann
George Corp. v. Old, 23 F.2d 803, 807-08 (4th Cir. 1928); Dresser v. Bates, 250 F. 525, 538-40
(1st Cir. 1918); Warner v. Penoyer, 91 F. 587, 590-92 (2d Cir. 1898); Rankin v. Cooper, 149
F. 1010, 1013 (W.D. Ark. 1907).
57 [1901] A.C. 477. The court in Lanza found the discussion of this case helpful in
its analysis of the development of common law in the area of fraudulent corporate transactions. 479 F.2d at 1291-92.
58 [1901] A.C. at 481-82.
59 Id. at 485.
60 Id. at 485-86.
61 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). This case is also discussed in Lanza at 479 F.2d at 1292.
62 298 F. at 615.
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It seems to me too much to say that [the outside director] must
read the circulars sent out to prospective purchasers and test them
against the facts .... To hold otherwise is practically to charge him
with detailed supervision of the business, which, consistently carried out, would have taken most of his time. If a director must go
so far as that, there will be no directors.68
Thus, it appears that the general principle at common law regarding directors was that liability should be imposed only as a con64
sequence of their own actions, and not for the misconduct of others.
Faced with both the background concerning rule lOb-5 and the
common law attitudes toward the duty to convey, the court in Lanza
was in effect being asked by the plaintiffs to interpret the rule as
requiring an outside director such as Coleman to insure the truthful
ness of all material information that the corporation presents to prospective purchasers. 65 The court was unable to look to any prior case
law dealing squarely with the possibility of such duty arising under the
rule. Consequently, it gave serious consideration to both the legisla
tive intent behind the 1933 and 1934 Acts, and areas of case law that
might have been indicative of developing trends concerning management liability of this nature. 6
In further attempting to interpret the rule, the court discussed
it in connection with sections 11 and 12, two antifraud provisions
found in the 1933 Act. 67 It was the court's opinion that to impose a
duty to convey upon directors under rule lOb-5 would be ignoring the
intent of Congress in creating sections 11 and 12.68 Those sections
explicitly limit the types of actions which can be brought thereunder
to those involving public offerings and original purchases respectively. 69
68 Id. at 620.,
64 Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 240 (1933). The

author proposes that "[d]enial of recovery to a plaintiff may . . . be rested upon a
finding that the defendant did not personally participate in the misrepresentation." Id.
65 It should be noted that the scope of duty imposed upon a director such as Coleman was a matter of concern that arose as a result of the decision in Escott v. BarChris
Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). One commentator has observed:
Considering Coleman solely as a director, another question emerges. To what
extent may he rely upon reports of officers and other responsible corporate personnel? The answer is far from clear.
Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case-Part ISection 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 55 VA. L. REv. 1, 39 (1969).
66 479 F.2d at 1289-93.
67 Id. at 1298-99.
68 Id. at 1299.
69 Section 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), deals with fraud committed in
the preparation of registration statements. To escape liability, one must show that, follow.
ing a reasonable investigation, he had reasonable grounds to believe that the statements
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In this regard, the court stated that "duties imposed upon directors in
' 70
private offerings were intended to be correspondingly less stringent
than those in public offerings. It went on to state that imposing such
a duty under rule lOb-5 "would take away from directors what is
granted to them by the private offering exemption and by the limitation of the due diligence duty to registration statements." 7'
Further, considering the legislative intent, the court referred to
72
Judge Adam's words in Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc.:
"There is no evidence that Congress intended that under Section
10(b) anyone should be an insurer against false7 3or misleading statements made non-negligently or in good faith."
By its rejection of the plaintiffs' contentions that an outside direcmade were in fact true. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3). This degree of reasonableness is defined in
the section as "that required of a prudent man in the management of his own property."
Id. § 77k(c).
The burden of proof faced by a defendant under section 11 was dealt with in Escott
v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The court in BarChris was of
the opinion that persons charged under the section must prove that they exercised "due
diligence" before they can avoid liability. See id. at 682-84. Various defendants were held
not to have sustained this burden of proof, despite the fact that a number of them were
shown to have had no knowledge of the existence of the fraud. Id. at 684-703.
Section 11, therefore, does go so far as to impose upon a director of a corporation a
duty of reasonable investigation concerning the accuracy of a registration statement. This
section, however, imposes such a duty only in connection with registration statements for
the public issuance of stock. As pointed out in the Lanza decision, the registration of the
stock in question was not required because the issuance of that stock did not involve a
public offering, and therefore was exempt under section 4(2) of the 1933 Act. 479 F.2d
at 1298. Consequently, the plaintiffs did not have a valid cause of action against Coleman
under section 11.
Section 12 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970), is concerned with prospectuses and
communications related to the issuance of a security. This section differs from section 11
in that the right of a cause of action can be maintained only by the original purchaser of
the security or, in the absence of this requirement of privity, a showing of scienter. 479
F.2d at 1298 (citing Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1967)). The burden of
proof that a defendant must sustain to escape liability is essentially the same as that under
section 11. See, e.g., Demarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 842 (2d Cir. 1968); Johns Hopkins
Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165, 1219 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970).
70 479 F.2d at 1299.
71 Id.
72 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972).
73 479 F.2d at 1299 (quoting from Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d
255, 280 (3d Cir. 1972)). In Kohn, Judge Adams went on to state:
Congress and the SEC both intended, before any liability for misrepresentation
might attach, that the element of culpability be present. This intent was manifested by the constant usage of words such as "cunning," "manipulative," "deceptive," "fraudulent," "illicit," "fraud," and lack of "good faith," and the absence of language indicating liability for negligent or non-negligent conduct.
458 F.2d at 280.
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tor has a duty to convey adverse, material information or that, absent
such a duty, he may be liable foi his negligent actions, the Lanza court
has added to the Second Circuit's limited interpretation of liability
under rule lOb-5. It would appear that in reaching this decision the
court was influenced' by its own attitude toward the question of
whether an element of scienter is required before liability will arise
in a private action under the rule. This attitude is clearly expressed
in Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co. 74 In that case the court stated

that there can be no violation of rule lOb-5
in the absence of allegation of facts amounting to scienter, intent
to defraud, reckless disregard for the truth, or knowing use of a
device, scheme or artifice to defraud. It is insufficient to allege mere
negligence . .

.7

The question of scienter poses a problem among the circuits, and
they are far from agreement on this issue. 76 Nevertheless, it is unlikely
that the Second Circuit, which has consistently rejected the notion
that negligence alone will make a director liable under the rule, would
74 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971).
75 Id. at 445.
76 For a recent analysis of the scienter problem, see Bucklo, Scienter and Rule iob-5,
67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562 (1972). The author points out what she believes to be three approaches the courts have taken toward this issue. Id. at 564-67. The first, espoused by
the Second Circuit, and originally stated in Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d
783 (2d Cir. 1951), requires an intent to defraud, thereby implying that mere negligence
on the part of the person being charged is insufficient. See id. at 786-87. The second,
supported by the Ninth Circuit in the often cited case of Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270
(9th Cir. 1961), rejects the requirement of fraud. The court in Ellis felt that Congress had
not restricted section 10(b) to common law fraud standards. Id. at 274. Bearing this in
mind, it would not narrowly construe that section's wording prohibiting "any 'manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance.' " Id. at 272. This is generally the argument that opponents of the scienter requirement put forth. Those in favor of the scienter standard, in
turn, use as their argument the very words of the rule, and say that they clearly indicate a
requisite of fraud, which in turn, cannot be the result of any action done without knowledge. See, e.g., GADsBY, supra note 33, § 5.03[l][d]. Bucklo points out that this approach in
Ellis has subsequently been used to support arguments prohibiting innocent misrepresentations as well as mere negligent misrepresentations. Bucklo, supra at 565. The third approach is one which takes a middle ground. As an example, Bucklo discusses yet another
well known case, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), which states:
"[S]ome form of the traditional scienter requirement," . . . sometimes defined as
"fraud," . . . is preserved. This requirement, whether it be termed lack of diligence, constructive fraud, or unreasonable or negligent conduct, remains implicit
in this standard ....
Id. at 855 (quoting from- Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1967)) (emphasis by
the court) (citation omitted). It should be noted that the first and third approaches discussed both come from the Second Circuit. Since the decision in Texas Gulf Sulphur,
however, the Second Circuit has clarified its position in Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill &
Co., 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971). See notes 74 & 75 supra and accompanying text.
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go so far as to hold that a director, who had no knowledge of a particular fraudulent act or acts perpetrated by other officers or directors of
his corporation, should be required to guarantee that all material information being conveyed to prospective purchasers is correct.
Another issue to be considered is whether the Lanza decision will
be effective as an argument in defending officers who are not outside
directors. Outside directors have been defined as "directors who are
not full-time employees of the corporation. ' 77 In adopting this definition, the Lanza court also refers to such directors as "non-officer directors." 78 While the court seemed to place heavy emphasis on the fact that
Coleman was an outside non-participating director, 9 it seems most
unlikely that Coleman or a director in a similar capacity would have
escaped liability had he in fact been involved in the transaction, regard.
less of what type of director he might have been. Arguably, the Lanza
holding could support the contention that any director or officer who
had not participated in a particular transaction might escape liability
under the rule.
It is interesting to note that Judge Hays, in his dissent, felt that
"[t]he distinction between an 'inside' and an 'outside' director is irrelevant" in Coleman's case due to his inaction in the situation. 80 Judge
Hays believed that, under the circumstances, Coleman had a responsibility "to keep himself adequately informed.""' This dissent, however,
seems contrary to the trend implied by the history and case law which
serves as a background for rule lob-5.
Looking beyond the court's decision with regard to a director's
77 Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of
CorporateDirectors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1092 (1968). For further discussion of
outside directors, see Blough, The Outside Director at Work on the Board, 28 REcosw op
N.Y.C.B.A. 202 (1973); Estes, Outside Directors: More Vulnerable Than Ever, Hv. Bus.
Rxv., Jan.-Feb., 1973, at 107; Israels, A New Look At Corporate Directorship,24 Bus. LAW.
727 (1969); Moscow, The Independent Director, 28 Bus. LAw. 9 (1972).
78 479 F.2d at 1306.
79 A good example of the court's emphasis of this fact is found in the words of its
holding:
We conclude that a director in his [Coleman's] capacity as a director (a nonparticipant in the transaction) owes no duty to insure that all material, adverse
information is conveyed to prospective purchasers of the stock of the corporation
on whose board he sits.
Id. at 1289 (emphasis added).
80 Id. at 1318.
81 Id. Judge Hays later states:
That Coleman's failure to act was negligent as opposed to calculated should not
insulate him from liability when action on his part might have prevented the
fraud perpetrated by the corporation whose activities he was under a duty to
supervise.
Id. at 1319.
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duty to convey, it is clear that Lanza is yet another in a long line of
cases that deal with the underlying question of whether rule lOb-5
should be limited or sweeping in its scope of liability. The case, by
its affirmation of the scienter standard, has added fuel to the burning
controversy among the circuits as to that issue. Further, in light of the
fact that the Second Circuit is a scienter circuit, it is far from certain
whether other circuits which are opposed to a strict scienter standard
will follow the Lanza holding regarding the liability of outside directors in similar situations. As a result, in its attempt to further clarify
the substantive requirements necessary for liability under rule lOb-5,
the Lanza decision may well bring that issue of the rule's scope one
82
step closer to a Supreme Court confrontation.
Jeffrey L. McCormick
82 Another author takes the same position. Ukropina, Lanza v. Drexel &r Co.: Some
Comfort for the Outside Director, But More Needed, 48 Los ANG..as B. BuLL. 330, 353
(1973).

